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Test of Multilateralism in International

Trade: U.S. Steel Safeguards

Y.S. Lee*
I.

INTRODUCTION'

A multilateral trading system, as currently embodied by the World
Trade Organization ("WTO"), operates based on mutually agreed
concessions among trading nations. The success of this system depends on
the observation of those trade concessions previously negotiated and agreed
upon among the members of the WTO ("Members").2 Under certain
conditions, the GATT/WTO rules authorize trade measures that restrict
imports unilaterally, beyond the bounds of those concessions.
The
* Associate Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law. Associate Editor, THE
JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE. Former Legal Counsel for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, South Korea.
1 Safeguard measures in international trade have received growing academic attention in
recent years. The author has published several articles and books on various issues of

safeguard measures in international trade. See, e.g., Y.S.

LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN

(forthcoming 2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter LEE,
SAFEGUARD MEASURES]; Y.S. Lee, Destabilization of the Discipline on Safeguards?:
Inherent Problems with the ContinuingApplication of Article XIX After the Settlement of the
Agreement on Safeguards, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 1235 (2001).
2 The creation of the WTO is memorialized in the Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter Final Act] and the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, April 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1141 (1994) [hereinafter WTO
Agreement]. Before the WTO, maximum tariff rates for each product classification were
provided in the Schedule of Concessions of Members. See General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. II, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. After a
series of multilateral trade negotiations, tariff rates for most non-primary products have been
substantially reduced. Since the Uruguay Round negotiations, the average tariff rate on nonprimary products of industrial countries has dropped to a mere 3.9%. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 74 (1997).
3 The WTO sets conditions for so-called administered protection measures in trade, such
as countervailing, safeguard and antidumping measures, in an annex and a related
WORLD TRADE: THE LEGAL ANALYsIs (2003)
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problem with unilateral import restrictions, such as safeguard measures, 4 is
that they upset the balance of concessions that was previously negotiated
between the importing and exporting Members.
The multilateral
framework upon which the current international trading system is built is
designed to maintain the balance of those concessions. The history of
safeguard measures recently applied by the United States to its imports of
steel products ("U.S. steel safeguards" or "steel safeguards") 6 demonstrates
how unilateral trade measures, motivated by internal domestic politics and
without strong legal justifications under the GATT/WTO rules, may affect
this multilateral framework and potentially lead to the destabilization of the
trading system.
On March 20, 2002, in response to the repeated requests of the ailing
U.S. steel industry, the Bush Administration applied controversial safeguard
measures. 7 Among the most controversial and significant trade measures in
recent history, these import restrictions were comprised of tariff increases
of up to 30% ad valorem as well as a tariff-quota applying to imports of a
range of steel products.8 It was the first instance of a major economy

agreement. See Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, supra note 2, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS, vol. 27, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994)
[hereinafter Agreements on Trade in Goods] (including the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, and the Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154
(1994) [hereinafter Safeguards Agreement]); Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Agreement on Trade in Goods
[hereinafter Antidumping Agreement].
4 Safeguard measures are emergency import restraints that are applicable where increased
imports cause or threaten to cause serious injury to a domestic industry. The rules governing
safeguard measures are provided by the Safeguards Agreement and Agreements on Trade in
Goods, supra note 3; GATT, supra note 2, art. XIX
5 The antidumping and countervailing measures are distinguishable from safeguard
measures because they attempt to remedy injury caused by unfair trade practices, such as
dumping and illegal subsidies. Therefore, they are not considered to disrupt the balance of
concessions among the exporting and importing countries. The term "balance of
concessions" is used in international trade circles, to describe trading nations' maintaining
the import concessions they agreed upon during the trade negotiations.
6 United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products,
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS248-DS259/ABiR, (Nov. 10, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 410
(2004) [hereinafter Report of the Appellate Body]; United States - Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, Report of the Panel, WT/DS248-DS259/R
(Jul. 11, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/distabase_e.htm,
[hereinafter Report of the Panel].
7 These measures were announced in Proclamation No. 7529, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,553, (Mar.
5, 2002), and Memorandum: Action Under Section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974 Concerning
Certain Steel Products, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,593 (Mar. 5, 2002).
8 The products subject to the U.S. safeguard measures included: certain carbon flat-rolled
steel; hot-rolled, cold-rolled, and other corrosion-resistant, coated flat steel; carbon and alloy
hot-rolled or cold-finished bar; carbon and alloy rebar; carbon and alloy welded tubular
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applying safeguard measures to one of the most traded products in the
world, with provisions affecting as many as 1.31 billion tons of steel trade
per year. Since the inception of the WTO in 1995, no trade measure has
ever provoked more intense criticism and extensive resistance throughout
the world. 9
The U.S. steel safeguards were perceived as a major
protectionist attempt by the United States, implemented to serve its political
interests without clear legal justifications under the GATT/WTO rules.' 0
The response of various steel-exporting Members to the U.S. steel
safeguards was swift and resolute. Within a mere two days of the United
States announcement of the steel safeguards, the European Communities
filed a complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"), and
began preparing a list of U.S. products subject to its retaliation. Several
other Members, including Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, Venezuela,
Norway and China, also formally joined the European Communities in this
dispute. The effect of the U.S. steel safeguards seems to have gone even
beyond the membership of the WTO, affecting Russia's decision to ban
imports of poultry from the United States." Consultations between the
United States and steel exporting countries did not produce any resolution
of the dispute, and a WTO established a dispute settlement 8 anel to
determine whether the measures complied with GATT/WTO rules.
Why did the United States apply such controversial safeguard
measures despite the worldwide criticism and resistance? What was the
political cause for those extraordinary measures and what were the legal
issues in the application of those measures?
Safeguard measures are
applied as import restrictions where increased imports cause or threaten to
cause serious injury to a domestic industry. 3 Safeguard measures are
intended to assist Members in handling acute, short-term problems, such as
unemployment, associated with the rapid increase in imports by authorizing
products; carbon and alloy fittings; stainless steel bar and rod; carbon and alloy tin mill
products; and stainless steel wire. Proclamation No. 7529, supra note 7.
9The U.S. steel safeguard measures attracted significant public attention worldwide,
making headlines all over the world and inviting strong objections from dozens of
governments, from Brasilia to London and from Seoul to Sidney.
10See infra Section II. (discussing the political reasons behind the application of these
U.S. safeguards, as well as their inconsistencies with the relevant GATT/WTO rules).
11According to a media report, this decision came two days after Russian steel producers
requested that their government block U.S. chicken imports, worth about $660 million last
year, if the Bush administration imposed sanctions on Russian steel. Warren Vieth &
Melinda Fulmer, Playing Chicken With Steel Imports Trade, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2002, at
Cl.
12 US.Steel Safeguards is considered the largest WTO panel case to date, with most of
the major economies of the world participating as direct parties in the case, including the
European Community, China, Japan, Brazil, Switzerland and New Zealand. Appellate Body
Report, supra note 6, at 410-11.
13Safeguards Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2.1.
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temporary import restraints until their domestic industry adjusts to
competition from imports. Political considerations are an important factor
in applying safeguard measures. 1 4 Nonetheless, the measures will be
upheld as long as they are consistent with the requirement of the
GATT/WTO rules. The next section discusses the background and
development of the U.S. steel safeguards. The remainder of this paper
addresses the legal issues raised in the U.S. steel safeguards, considers how
the multilateral framework of the current international trading system
operated to resolve the dispute, and attempts to draw lessons for the future
application of trade measures such as safeguards.
II. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. STEEL
SAFEGUARDS 15
A. The State of the U.S. Steel Industry
The U.S. steel industry, which once symbolized the might of American
industrial power, is an industry in crisis. During the latter half of the 2 0th
century, the U.S. steel industry lost its competitive edge against foreign
steel producers, who employed advanced production technologies and built
better facilities.16 Because they enjoyed dominance in the domestic market
for a long time through oligopoly, U.S. steel producers did not make
17
necessary investments to modernize their aging steel production facilities.
As a result, the cost efficiency of U.S. steel production fell significantly
below that of its competitors by the 1970s.1 8 Excessive labor costs have
also played a role in the decreased competitiveness of U.S. steel. By 1958,
the U.S. steel industry had already faced the highest unit labor costs in the
world, which continued to increase throughout the latter half of the 2 0 th
century, greatly exceeding actual labor productivity.1 9 Further, by 2001,
affected by worldwide over-production, steel prices dropped to their lowest
point in twenty years.20 The U.S. steel producers sustained significant
14 Id. at
15 This

MEASURES,

10-14.
section is developed based on the author's own previous work.

LEE, SAFEGUARD

supra note 1, at 83-92.

16 WILLIAM

H.

BARRINGER

& KENNETH J.

PIERCE, PAYING THE PRICE FOR BIG STEEL:

YEARS OF THE INTEGRATED STEEL COMPANIES' CAPTURE OF

U.S.

TRADE POLICY

30

25-34

(2000).
17 Id

18 The unit cost per metric ton of steel in the United States was lower than that in Japan in
1958 but became twice as high as that in Japan by 1976. Id. at chart 1-1.
"9Id. at 35-38.
2°A Tricky Business: Steel Companies Feel the Heat,
ECONOMIST, June 30, 2001,
available at http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/-hiscox/TrickyBusiness.htm

U.S. Steel Safeguards
25:69 (2004)
losses, and no fewer than eighteen U.S. steel companies filed for
bankruptcy between January 1998 and June 2001. This declining state of
the U.S. steel industry resulted in significant job loss, as many as 5,000 in
average a year since 1990.21
The job loss and the downward pressure on prices were not unique in
the U.S. steel industry, but were prevalent throughout the world due to the
substantial increased productivity. Smaller mills became unprofitable and
economies of scale induced them to merge into more sizable ones, which
then led to excess production capacity. Over-production, which was known
to exceed needed capacity as much as 20%,22 caused a long-term downward
trend in prices and made the condition of the steel industry particularly
vulnerable to the demand fluctuations that typically occur during economic
recessions.
Facing this crisis, the well-organized U.S. steel producers petitioned
the federal government for assistance. The U.S. government, affected by
the significant political influence of the steel unions and producers, offered
extensive aid, including various trade protection measures and financial
subsidies.
Steel products have received more protection from trade
measures, such as numerous antidumping actions and countervailing duties,
than any other U.S. industry.23 The financial support that resulted from
negotiations with the federal government included tens of billions of dollars
in aid,24 comprised of pension bailouts, tax refunds, environmental
regulation exemption subsidies, "Buy America" requirements and
emergency loan guarantee schemes.25
The recent U.S. steel safeguards were considered yet another attempt
in a long line of protections offered to this troubled industry, delaying rather
than accelerating the industry's inevitable structural adjustment.
The
application of the U.S. safeguard measures was considered particularly
improper. Such measures are predicated on an increase in imports that
causes or threatens to cause serious injury to the domestic industry, but steel

id.
Id.
23 For example, in 2002, the U.S. government applied about half of the existing 264
antidumping actions to the imports of steel products, although steel accounts for only two
21
22

percent of total imports. In addition, as many as thirty-five countervailing measures were
also applied to steel products at the same time. U.S. Int'l Trade Admin., Antidumping and
CountervailingDuty Statistics (Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders in effect as of
July 26, 2002), at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/ad-1980-2003.html (last modified Feb. 6, 2004).
24 A recent study revealed that the steel lobby had won at least $16 billion ($21.8 billion
in constant 1999 dollars) in federal subsidies for domestic steel makers from U.S. taxpayers
with additional billions received from state and local governments. BARRINGER & PIERCE,
supra note 16, at 25-34.
25 id.
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imports had declined in recent years in most categories.2 6 Many believed
that the U.S. steel safeguards were motivated primarily by the Bush
Administration's pursuit of political support from the steel union for the
upcoming Congressional elections as well as its pursuit of support for a
Congressional bill giving the President trade negotiating ("fast-track")
authority.27
B.

Development of U.S. Steel Safeguards

As mentioned above, the U.S. steel safeguards faced strong and open
opposition from United States' major trading partners. 28 What was
alarming during the initial stages of the application of the U.S. steel
safeguards was that the United States seemed to have made little effort to
avoid trade disputes with its concerned trading partners through adequate
consultations. The Agreement on Safeguards ("Safeguards Agreement" or
"SA") requires a Member proposing to adopt such a measure to provide an
adequate opportunity for prior consultations with those Members having a
substantial export interest. 29 A Member proposing to apply a safeguard
measure must provide an opportunity for consultation with a view toward
developing a discourse regarding the measure in which affected Members
participate in order to achieve a balance in the previously negotiated
concessions to be upset by the application of the safeguard.3 °
As discussed below, the United States did not provide adequate
consultation opportunities sufficiently prior to its application of the steel
safeguards. Nevertheless, in attempting to influence the United States,
major steel exporting Members rushed to the consultations with the United
States but failed to resolve the growing dispute. The United States' major
trading partners, including the European Communities, China, Korea,
Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, Norway and Brazil, requested the
establishment of a panel to review the consistency of the U.S. steel
safeguards with GATT/WTO rules.
The panel was subsequently
26 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. imports of steel products decreased
substantially from 34,433,707 metric tons in 2000 to 27,350,808 metric tons in 2001. U.S.
Census Bureau, U.S. Imports for Consumption of Steel Products, Exhibit 1, available at
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/200lpr/12/steel/steelf.pdf (last modified
Feb. 21, 2002).
27 In fact, after the Congressional vote on the trade promotion authority legislation, the
Administration granted a large number of exemptions from the measures, which seems to
provide support for this view. These exemptions were criticized by U.S. steel producers and
unions. Barry C. Lynn, The Real Steel Deal, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Dec. 30, 2002, at 17.
28 Canada and Mexico, however, did not raise any objections to the U.S. steel safeguards
since their steel exports were exempted from the safeguard list.
29 Safeguards Agreement, supra note 3, art. 12.3.
30 Id. For further discussion of this issue, see LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES, supra note 1,

ch. 11.3.
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established to review the biggest trade dispute in recent history.3 1

In

addition, several Members, including the European Communities, Japan,
China, Switzerland and Norway also
proposed extensive retaliations
32
prompted by the U.S. steel safeguards.
The danger of a worldwide trade war, which could have been triggered
by the adoption of a series of retaliatory measures, was narrowly averted by
later negotiations. When the United States agreed to reduce restrictions on
a number of steel products, as much as twenty-five percent in terms of
tonnage, from its safeguards list, 33 talk of retaliatory measures temporarily
ceased. Had the United States conducted consultations seriously enough to
accommodate the concerns of the steel exporting countries in its
implementation of the steel safeguards, rather than waiting until it was
threatened with retaliation, this dangerous confrontation might not have
31WTO Secretariat, Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products,
Constitution of the Panel Establishedat the Request of the European Communities, Japan,
Korea, China, Switzerland, Norway, New Zealandand Brazil, WT/DS248/15, WT/DS249/9,
WT/DS251/10, WT/DS252/8, WT/DS253/8, WT/DS254/8, WT/DS258/12, WT/DS259/11
(Aug. 12, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/docs-e.htm.
32WTO Counsel for Trade in Goods, Committee on Safeguards, Immediate Notification
Under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Councilfor Trade in Goods of
ProposedSuspension of Concessions and Other Obligations Referred to in Paragraph2 of
Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards, European Communities, G/SG/43 (May 15,
2002); WTO Counsel for Trade in Goods, Committee on Safeguards, Immediate Notification
Under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Councilfor Trade in Goods of
ProposedSuspension of Concessions and Other Obligations Referred to in Paragraph2 of
Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards, Japan,G/SG/44 (May 21, 2002); WTO Counsel
for Trade in Goods, Committee on Safeguards, Immediate Notification Under Article 12.5 of
the Agreement on Safeguards to the Councilfor Trade in Goods of ProposedSuspension of
Concessionsand Other ObligationsReferred to in Paragraph2 ofArticle 8 of the Agreement
on Safeguards, Norway, G/SG/45 (May 21, 2002); WTO Counsel. for Trade in Goods,
Committee on Safeguards, Immediate Notification Under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on
Safeguards to the Councilfor Trade in Goods of Proposed Suspension of Concessions and
Other Obligations Referred to in Paragraph2 of Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards,
The People's Republic of China, G/SG/46 (May 21, 2002); WTO Counsel for Trade in
Goods, Committee on Safeguards, Immediate Notification Under Article 12.5 of the
Agreement on Safeguards to the Councilfor Trade in Goods of Proposed Suspension of
Concessionsand Other ObligationsReferred to in Paragraph2 ofArticle 8 of the Agreement
on Safeguards, Switzerland, G/SG/47
(May 22, 2002), all available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/docs_e.htm.
33 WTO Counsel for Trade in Goods, Committee on Safeguards, Notification Pursuantto
Article 12.1(C) of the Agreement on Safeguards Upon Taking a Decision to Apply a
Safeguard Measure, United States, G/SG/N/I0/USA/6/Suppl.7, G/SG/N/1 1/USA/5/Suppl.7
(Sept. 17, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/docse.htm. Despite the
position of the U.S. government that the exclusion was based on U.S. consumer need and on
the determination that the exclusion would not undermine the effectiveness of the safeguard
measure, it was widely considered that the purpose of the exclusion was to avoid serious
trade conflict with the major trading partners of the United States. See Jeffrey Sparshott,
E. U. Retaliatory Trade Barriers Go Up, WASH. TIMES, May 1, 2004, at C10.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business
taken place.

25:69 (2004)

34

The WTO panel found that the U.S. steel safeguards were not
consistent with the relevant GATT/WTO rules.35 The United States
appealed this panel decision, and the Appellate Body upheld the panel
decision, albeit with some modification, 36 which was subsequently accepted
and implemented by the United States. As a result, the proposed retaliatory
measures against U.S. exports were never put into effect, and the United
States subsequently withdrew the steel safeguards.3 7
While the U.S. concessions and final withdrawal of the steel
safeguards prevented a direct trade war, the controversial U.S. steel
safeguards triggered protectionism in other countries. Fearing possible
diversion of steel products from the protected U.S. market, some Members,
including the European Communities, China and Hungary, applied
provisional safeguard measures against their own steel imports while
initiating investigations for definitive safeguard measures. 38 The European
Communities have made an affirmative injury determination and decided to
39
apply a definitive safeguard measure on imports of seven steel products.
34 On the other hand, such accommodation in the initial consultations may not have been

politically palatable, as the Bush Administration had tried to garner political support from
steel producing regions by implementing effective steel safeguards.
35 Report of the Panel, supranote 6. The author also expressed a view that the U.S. steel
safeguards were inconsistent with the relevant GATT/WTO rules. LEE, SAFEGUARD
MEASURES,

supra note 1, at 166-68.

36 Report of the Panel, supra note 6.
37 WTO Committee on Safeguards, Notification Pursuant to Article 12.1(C) of the

Agreement on Safeguards Upon Taking a Decision to Apply a Safeguard Measure, United
States, G/SG/N/10/USA/6/Suppl.8 (Dec. 12, 2003), availableat http://www.wto.org/english/
tratope/safege/safege.htm.
38 WTO Committee on Safeguards, Notification Under Article 12.1(A) of the Agreement
on Safeguards on Initiation of an Investigation and the Reasons for it, Notification Under
Article 12.4 of the Agreement on Safeguards Before Taking a Provisional Safeguard
MeasureReferred to in Article 6, Notification Under Article 9, Footnote 2 of the Agreement
on Safeguards, European Communities, G/SG/N/7/EEC/1 (Apr. 2, 2002); WTO Committee
on Safeguards, Notification Under Article 12.1(A) of the Agreement on Safeguards on
Initiation of an Investigation and the Reasons for it, Notification Under Article 12.4 of the
Agreement on Safeguards Before Taking a ProvisionalSafeguard Measure Referred to in
Article 6, and Notification Under Article 9, Footnote 2 of the Agreement on Safeguards, The
People's Republic of China, G/SG/N/7/CHN/1 (May 23, 2002); WTO Committee on
Safeguards, Notification UnderArticle 12.1(A) of the Agreement on Safeguards on Initiation
of an Investigation and the Reasons for it, Notification Under Article 12.4 of the Agreement
on Safeguards Before Taking a Provisional Safeguard Measure Referred to in Article 6,
Notification Under Article 9, Footnote 2 of the Agreement on Safeguards, Hungary,
G/SG/N/7/HUN/I1 (May 23, 2002), all available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/
safeg e/safege.htm.
39 Commission Regulation 1694/2002 of September 27 Imposing Definitive Safeguard
Measures Against Imports of Certain Steel Products, 2002 O.J. (L 261). See also WTO
Committee on Safeguards, Notification Under Article 12.1(B) of the Agreement on
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Hungary and China also applied their own safeguards. 40 Canada, whose
steel exports were not subject to the U.S. steel safeguards, also initiated an
investigation for the application of a safeguard measure and subsequently
made a positive injury determination.4 Several other Members, including
Chile, the Czech Republic, Mexico, Poland and Bulgaria have also initiated
investigations for safeguard measures against steel products, creating a
danger of the worldwide steel protections.
The worst scenario, leading to a chaotic sprawl of "protections," one
after another, was clearly in sight.
Thus, a significant threat to
multilateralism in the world trading system had emerged. The current
trading system is based on the mutual commitments on trade concessions
and on the respect for the multilateral legal framework.
Surely,
multilateralism in international trade will not be sustainable in an
environment where unilateral protectionism is rampant. Use of safeguard
measures in the absence of adequate legal justifications may tempt other
trading nations to respond in kind in order to protect domestic producers. It
is therefore necessary to review the legal justifications for the U.S. steel
safeguards under the WTO rules. The next section does so with reference
to the relevant GATT/WTO rules, namely Article XIX of the GATT and the
WTO Agreement on Safeguards.4 2

Safeguards on Finding a Serious Injury or Threat Thereof Caused by Increased Imports,
Notification Pursuant to Article 12.1(C) of the Agreement on Safeguards, European
Communities, G/SG/N/8/EEC/1, G/SGIN/10/EEC/1 (Sept. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.wto.org.
40 WTO Committee on Safeguards, Notification Under Article 12.1(C) of the Agreement
on Safeguards on Finding a Serious Injury or Threat Thereof Caused by IncreasedImports,
Notification Pursuant to Article 12.1(B) of the Agreement on Safeguards, Notification Under

Article 9, Footnote 2 of the Agreement on Safeguards, Hungary, G/SG/N/1O/HUN/1 (Apr. 7,
2003), availableat http://www.wto.org; WTO Committee on Safeguards, Notification Under
Article 12.1(B) of the Agreement on Safeguards on Finding a Serious Injury or Threat
Thereof Caused by Increased Imports, Notification Pursuant to Article 12.1(C) of the
Agreement on Safeguards, Notification Under Article 9, Footnote 2 of the Agreement on

Safeguards, People's Republic of China, G/SGiN/10/CHN/1 (Nov. 5, 2002), available at
http://www.wto.org.
41 WTO Committee on Safeguards, Notification Under Article 12.1(A) of the Agreement
on Safeguards on Initiation of an Investigation and the Reasons for it, Canada,

G/SG/N/6/CAN/1 (Apr. 2, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org; WTO Committee on
Safeguards, Notification Under Article 12.1 (B) of The Agreement on Safeguardson Finding
a Serious Injury or Threat Thereof Caused by IncreasedImports, Canada,G/SG/N/8/CAN/1
(July 19, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org. However, Canada did not decide to apply
the safeguard measure.
42 GATT, supra note 2, at art. XIX.
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LEGAL ISSUES IN THE APPLICATION OF THE U.S. STEEL
SAFEGUARDS
A. Unforeseen Developments

Paragraph 1(a) of Article XIX of the GATT provides,
If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the
obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement,
including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the
territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and under
such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic
producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the
contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to extent
and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury,
to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify
the concession. 43

The "unforeseen developments" clause was not included in the
subsequent Agreement on Safeguards, 44 and a question arose as to whether
this particular clause imposes any substantive legal requirement on a
Member applying a safeguard measure. a This question was posed to the
43 GATT, supra note 2, art. XIX,

1(a) (emphasis

added).

44 Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, which lays out the general conditions for

the application of a safeguard measure, does not include this "unforeseen development
clause." It provides,
A Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that Member has determined
that such product is being imported into its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or
relative to domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause
serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products.
Safeguards Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2.1 (Footnote omitted).
45 This question was first raised in the WTO panel cases. See Korea - Definitive
Safeguard Measure on the Imports of Certain Dairy Products, Report of the Panel,
WT/DS98/R (June 21, 1999) [hereinafter PanelReport on Korea - DairyProducts]; Korea Definitive Safeguard Measure on the Imports of Certain Dairy Products, Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS98/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report on
Korea - Dairy Products]; Argentina - Safeguard Measure on the Imports of Footwear,
Report of the Panel, WT/DS 121 /R (June 25, 1999) [hereinafter PanelReport on Argentina Footwear]; Argentina - Safeguard Measure on the Imports of Footwear, Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS121/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report on
Argentina - Footwear], all available at http://www.wto.org. See also the following WTO
cases (concerning safeguard measures referenced throughout this paper): United States Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten From the European
Communities, Report of the Panel, WT/DS 166/R (July 31, 2000) [hereinafter Panel Report
on United States - Wheat Gluten]; United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Wheat Gluten From the European Communities, Report of the Appellate Body,
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Appellate Body of the WTO DSB, which ruled that a Member adopting a
safeguard measure must demonstrate as a matter of fact the existence of
"unforeseen developments" leading to an increase in imports that caused
serious injury or its4 6threat to the domestic industry, pursuant to paragraph
1(a) of Article XIX.
There has been a controversy as to whether this "unforeseen
developments" clause should be interpreted to impose any legal
requirement at all. In fact, the panels in Korea - Dairy Products and
Argentina - Footwear ruled that the "unforeseen developments" clause in
Article XIX creates no legal obligation.47 Furthermore, the justification of
the Appellate Body ruling on this issue has been questioned. 8 Despite this
controversy, the Appellate Body's position has remained unchanged, and
the subsequent panels have followed this precedent.4 9
In their complaint filed with the WTO, the countries opposing the U.S.
WT/DS166/AB/R (Dec. 22, 2000) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report on United States Wheat Gluten]; United States - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen
Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, Report of the Panel, WT/DS177/R,
WT/DS178/R (Dec. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Panel Report on United States - Lamb Meat];
United States - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat
from New Zealand and Australia, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS177/AB/R,
WT/DS178/AB/R (May 1, 2001) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report on United States Lamb Meat]; United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Steel Wire Rod
and CircularWelded Carbon QualityLine Pipe, Report of the Panel, WT/DS202/R (Oct. 29,
2001) [hereinafter Panel Report on United States - Line Pipe], United States - Definitive
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Steel Wire Rod and Circular Welded Carbon Quality
Line Pipe, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS202/AB/R (Feb. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Appellate
Body Report on United States - Line Pipe]; Chile-Price Band System and Safeguard
Measures relating to Certain Agricultural Products, Report of the Panel, WT/DS207/R
(May 3, 2002) [hereinafterPanel Report on Chile - AgriculturalProducts](the issues in the
case relating to safeguards were not appealed); Argentina - Definitive SafeguardMeasure on
Imports of Preserved Peaches, Report of the Panel, WT/DS238/R (Feb. 14, 2003)
[hereinafter Panel Report on Argentina - Preserved Peaches] (the panel rulings were not
appealed); all available at http://www.wto.org; Report of the Panel, supra note 6; Report of
the Appellate Body, supra note 6.
46 Appellate Body Report on Korea - Dairy Products, supra note 45, 90; Appellate
Body Report on Argentina - Footwear, supra note 45,
97; Appellate Body Report on
United States - Lamb Meat, supra note 45,
72, 73.
47 Panel Report on Korea - Dairy Products, supra note 45, 7.42; Panel Report on
Argentina - Footwear, supra note 45,
8.69. As discussed above, the Appellate Body
reversed those panel positions and ruled that the "unforeseen developments" clause does
create an affirmative legal obligation to prove the existence of "unforeseen developments."
Appellate Body Report on Korea - Dairy Products, supra note 45, 90; Appellate Body
Report on United States - Lamb Meat, supra note 45,
72, 73.
48 See LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES, supra note 1, at 101-107 (concerning the controversy
regarding the "unforeseen developments" clause and the applicability of Article XIX).
49 Pursuant to the Appellate Body ruling, the recent panel in Argentina - Preserved
Peaches recognized Members' obligation to demonstrate "unforeseen developments." Panel
Report on Argentina - PreservedPeaches,supra note 45, 7.12.
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steel safeguards argued that the United States had failed to adequately
demonstrate the existence of "unforeseen developments. 50 The United
States disagreed, claiming that it had in fact sufficiently identified
unforeseen developments. 5 The panel considered this issue, following the
standard of review previously affirmed by the Appellate Body5 2 that "the
Panel must examine whether the United States demonstrated in its
published report, through a reasoned and adequate explanation, that
unforeseen developments and the effects of tariff concessions resulted in
increased imports causing or threatening to cause serious injury to the
relevant domestic producers. 53
The United States argued that it had identified the financial crises that
engulfed Southeast Asia and the former U.S.S.R., the continued strength of
the United States' market and persistent appreciation of the U.S. dollar, and
the confluence of all of these events, as unforeseen developments.54 The
complainants responded that, neither standing alone, nor in combination did
these events amount to an unforeseen development, as the United States
should have foreseen them. 55 The issue was further complicated by the fact
that the original report of the United States International Trade Commission
("USITC"), 6 which included a discussion of the Asian and Russian crises,
did not specifically address the question of "unforeseen developments" and
the Second Supplementary Report was subsequently produced to address
this issue. 57 The complainants argued that the Supplementary Report
should have been disregarded, as it did not comprise the original USITC
report and was an ex post attempt to demonstrate the existence of
"unforeseen developments.
Article 3.1 of the SA provides, in relevant part, "The competent
authorities shall publish a report setting forth their findings and reasoned
conclusions reached on all pertinent issues of fact and law." The strictly
literal interpretation of this clause seems to indicate that the national
50Report of the Panel, supra note 6,

10.32.

"' Id. 10.33.
52Appellate Body Report on United States -Lamb Meat, supra note 45,
103-06.
53Report of the Panel, supra note 6, 10.38 (footnote omitted). Also citing the previous
Appellate Body rulings, the Panel stated that it would examine whether the competent
authorities "considered all the relevant facts and had adequately explained how the facts
supported the determinations that were made." Id. 10.39. (Footnote omitted). The
Appellate Body subsequently affirmed this Panel approach. See Report of the Appellate
Body, supra note 6, 279.
54Report of the Panel, supra note 6, 10.40.
55Id.
56 U.S. International Trade Commission, Steel, USITC Pub.3479, Inv. No. TA-201-73
(Dec. 2001), at http://www.usitc.gov (last modified Aug. 25, 2004).
51Id. 10.47.

58

id.
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authority must publish a comprehensive single report to explain its decision
on a safeguard measure. Multiple reports do not seem consistent with this
provision.59 With respect to the multiple investigation reports produced by
the United States, the Panel considered that the national authority's report
may be produced in parts as long as they form a coherent and integrated
explanation providing satisfaction
with the requirements of Article XIX and
60
the Agreement on Safeguards.
In the Panel's view, the timing of the demonstration of "unforeseen
developments" is adequate as long as it is made prior to the application of a
safeguards measure in accordance with the earlier Appellate Body
decision. 61 As the Supplementary Report was published before the
application of the U.S. steel safeguards, the demonstration of unforeseen
developments was timely,62 although its adequacy was a separate issue.
The Panel, therefore, accepted the Supplementary Report as part of the
investigation report for its examination and considered the adequacy of the
USITC analysis on "unforeseen developments" based on this Report.
In assessing the adequacy of the USITC's explanation of the
unforeseen developments, the Panel first considered its explanation of why
the events were unforeseen and then moved on to consider the explanation
of how the unforeseen developments resulted in increased imports. 63 These
considerations were applied to each of the four events listed in the USITC
report and to the confluence of those events as explained in the report.
The Panel's holdings as to the basis for the events being unforeseen
were as follows: As to the Asian financial crisis, the Panel ruled that the
event was not foreseen due to its having taken place well after the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round.64 As to the Russian financial crisis, the
unforeseen developments identified by the USITC were the "unanticipated
financial difficulties," in the form of "intense financial disruptions and
currency fluctuations" between 1996 and 1999, resulting from the
dissolution of the Soviet Union.6 5 The Panel accepted, arguendo, that there
may have been unforeseen financial disruptions and currency fluctuations
between 1996 and 1999 that were thus unforeseen at the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round.66

59 For a further discussion of the adequacy of an investigation report, see LEE,

supra note 1, at 144-45.
Report of the Panel, supra note 6, 10.50.
61 Appellate Body Report on United States - Lamb Meat, supra note 45,
62 Report of the Panel, supra note 6,
10.54.
63 Id. 10.69.

SAFEGUARD MEASURES,
60

72.

64 The parties agreed that the point in time at which developments should have been
unforeseen is that of the completion of the Uruguay Round. Id. 10.74.
65 Id. 10.83.
61 Id. 10.85.
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With respect to the strength of the U.S. market as well as the
appreciation of the U.S. dollar vis-A-vis other foreign currencies, the Panel
was of the view that the USITC considered neither of those factors to be
stand-alone "unforeseen developments," but considered them along with the
other alleged unforeseen developments and as part of a set of world events
which together constituted unforeseen developments.6 7 Therefore, the
Panel did not reach the issue of whether such factors could individually
constitute unforeseen developments. 68 The United States, however, argued
that the Panel acknowledged that the confluence of those
factors could be
69
considered unforeseen within the context of Article XIX.
In the second analytical prong of the unforeseen development issue
(i.e., how the unforeseen developments resulted in increased imports), the
Panel probed the logical connection between the unforeseen developments
and the increased imports. 70 To pass this prong of the test, the authority
must make a coherent demonstration of a direct connection between
unforeseen developments and increased imports. In the Panel's review, the
logical connection was not properly drawn in the USITC Report. The
initial USITC Report did not identify or discuss the unforeseen events in
terms of an explanation of a resulting increase in injurious imports. Thus,
the Panel ruled that the explanation failed to establish the link between the
unforeseen developments and the increase in imports. 7'
The Panel reasoned that the Secondary Supplementary Report only
stated the overall effects of the Asian and Russian financial crises, together
with the strong U.S. dollar and economy, to displace steel to other markets
without any specific data to support this USITC conclusion.72 In affirming
the Panel decision, the Appellate Body emphasized the national
investigating authority's obligation to provide reasoned conclusions with
respect to unforeseen developments, stating that it is not for panels to find
support for such conclusions "by cobbling together73 disjointed references
scattered throughout a competent authority's report."
The Panel acknowledged that the USITC Report described a plausible
set of unforeseen developments that may have resulted in increased imports
to the United States from various sources, but in the Panel's view, the
USITC failed to demonstrate that such developments actually resulted in
67

Id.

10.89, 10.93.

68 Report of the Panel, supra note 6,
69 Id. 10.100.

10.94.

70 Report of the Panel, supra note 6, 10.104.
7 Id.
10.116. The Panel also noted that the initial USITC Report does not even
specifically refer to the issue of unforeseen developments, and there are only ad hoc
references to the Asian and Russian financial crises. Id.IT 10.116 -10.118.
72 Id.99 10.121-10.123.
73 Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 6,
326.
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increased steel imports into the United States injurious to the domestic
producers.74 On appeal, the United States argued that the Panel had failed
to consider relevant data appearing in other sections of the USITC Report
that supported the USITC's finding that "unforeseen developments" had
resulted in increased imports. The Appellate Body denied that the Panel
had such an obligation, as it is for the national investigating authority and
not for the Panel to provide the adequate, coherent reasoning.
In sum, the USITC's determination of "unforeseen developments" was
inadequate since it did not outline the logical connection between the
unforeseen developments and injury to the domestic injury with respect to
the specific steel products at issue.' 6 A consideration of the relevant steel
products would have been necessary, since the steel producers in the United
States were of the view that the effect of the developments was different on
different steel products at issue.77 The Appellate Body also affirmed the
Panel's holding that the investigating authority must demonstrate
"unforeseen developments" with each product subject to a safeguard
78
measure.
Despite the Panel and Appellate Body decisions, it is not altogether
clear that the requirement of "unforeseen developments," which the
Appellate Body imported from the old Article XIX and not from the SA,
has a legitimate place in safeguard jurisprudence. The history of the
Uruguay Round negotiations on the safeguard rules suggests that the
negotiators did not intend to include the "unforeseen developments" clause
as a legal requirement in the new safeguard measures because it did not
appear in the draft agreement, while they repeated all important provisions
in the new Agreement.79 In fact, there has been an argument as to whether
the old safeguard rules under Article XIX are still applicable at all, even
after the settlement of the Agreement on Safeguards.80
The ambiguous nature of the "unforeseen developments" clause is
another problem. The term used in the original clause is "unforeseen" and
74 Report of the Panel, supra note 6,
10.121, 10.123.
75 Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 6, 329.
76 Report of the Panel, supra note 6,
10.124-10.126.
" Id.

10.127.
78 Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 6, 316.
79 In the initial draft agreement, the "unforeseen developments" clause was included, and
a 1990 draft amplified it by specifying the obligation to establish an "unforeseen, sudden and
significant increase." By mid-1990, this clause was removed from the text altogether since
both the United States and European Communities objected this terminology of being too
difficult and restrictive to apply. PIERRE DIDIER, LES PRICiPAUX AccoRDS DE L'OMC ET
LEUR TRANsoposITioN DANS Loi COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENE (1997), at 271-272. For further
discussions of the history of safeguard rules, see LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES, supra note 1,

ch. 3.

80 LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES, supra note 1, ch. 8.1.
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not "unforeseeable," which refers to the subjective, rather than objective,
state of perception about the future event. The Appellate Body, having
acknowledged this subjectivity, made a distinction between "unforeseen"
and "unforeseeable.'
Nonetheless, the Panel in U.S. Steel Safeguards
opined that the standard is not what the specific negotiators at trade
negotiations making import concessions had in mind, but rather what they
could have reasonably expected, 2 which seems to blur the earlier
distinction made by the Appellate Body between "unforeseen" and
"unforeseeable." It is doubtful that there can be any clear standard to
determine "unforeseen developments," without deviating from the language
in the provision, which indicates that the subjective state of foresight, or
lack thereof is difficult to determine by objective standards.83 Certain
provisions in the SA also seem to have been drafted on the presumption the
SA is the sole articulation of the international rules on safeguards.8 4 The
controversies surrounding the requirement of "unforeseen developments"
under old Article XIX will likely continue beyond U.S. Steel Safeguards.
B. Increase in Imports
To be legitimate, safeguard measures must be predicated on increased
imports. Article 2.1 of the SA provides in the relevant part,
A Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only ifthat
Member has determined that such product is being imported into its
territory in such increasedquantities, absolute or relative to domestic
production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause
serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly
competitive products.85
The increase in imports is also one of the eight factors to consider in the
injury determination under Article 4.2(a) of the SA, discussed below.
The U.S. steel safeguards were controversial in part because the
alleged increase in steel imports was disputed. General steel import
statistics show decreasing rather than increasing import trends toward the
end of the investigating period. For instance, according to the U.S. Census
Bureau, steel product imports decreased significantly from 34,433,707

81Appellate Body Report on Korea - Dairy Products,supra note 45,

84.

82 Report of the Panel, supranote 6, 10.43.
83For more discussion, see Y.S. Lee, Destabilizationof the Discipline on Safeguards? Inherent Problems with the ContinuingApplication of Article XIX after the settlement of the
Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 1, at 1236-42.
84 See id.

85 Safeguards Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2.1 (emphasis added).
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metric tons in 2000 to 27,350,808 metric tons in 2001.86 The Panel
reviewed the United States determination on the increased imports with
respect to the steel products subject to the U.S. steel safeguards.
Following the Appellate Body's Argentina - Footwear ruling, the

Panel held that the increase in imports must reflect "a certain degree of
recentness, suddenness, sharpness and significance., 87 The increase in
imports needs not continue up to the period immediately preceding the
imposition of safeguards, nor up to the very end of the period of
investigation.8 8 Would a decrease in imports at the end of the period of
investigation prevent a finding of increased imports? According to the
Panel, that would depend on the duration and the degree of the decrease, as
well as the nature of the increase that took place. 89 An investigating
authority is not obligated to90consider any data that becomes available after it
has made its determination.
The Panel reviewing the U.S. steel safeguards made measure-bymeasure assessments of the USITC determinations, focusing on each
specific product. Due to decreasing import trends toward the end of the
investigation period, the Panel ruled that no adequate and reasoned
explanation was offered to prove an increase in imports for certain carbon
flat-rolled steel products (CCRFS), hot-rolled bar, and stainless steel rods,
and that the claimed increases in imports were not sufficiently recent. 91 The
Appellate Body, emphasizing the national 92investigating authority's
responsibility to examine import trends, affirmed.
On the other hand, the Panel found that the USITC had provided an
adequate and reasoned explanation of increased imports with respect to
cold-finished bar, rebar, welded pipe, fittings, flanges and tool joints (FFTJ)
and stainless steel bar where there were significant increases in imports in
the recent past from the determination as supported by the overall trends.
The difference from the products noted above was that imports of these
products reflected sharp increases followed by relatively insignificant

86

U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Imports for Consumption of Steel Products, supra note 26,

at Ex. 1.
87 Report of the Panel, supra note 6, 9 10.167.

The Appellate Body subsequently

confirmed this Panel position. Report of the Appellate Body, supranote 6,
88 Report of the Panel, supra note 6,
10.162.
89Id. 10.163.
90 Id. 10.173.

361.

"1Id. 10.178-10.187, 10.201-10.210, 10.264-10.277.
92 Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 6,
369, 376, 383, 399. The Appellate
Body disagreed with the Panel's conclusion regarding stainless steel rods, but it nonetheless
supported the Panel finding that the United States failed to provide a reasoned and adequate
explanation of how the facts supported its determination of increased imports of this product.

Id. 99 395-99.
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93

drops.

Where the USITC Commissioners had made divergent findings on the
increased imports, as in the case of tin mill products and stainless steel wire,
the Panel ruled that it was impossible to reconcile these findings, given that
they were based on differently defined products.94 The Panel considered
that a Member is not allowed to base under Articles 2.1 and 3.1 of the
Agreement on Safeguards a safeguard measure "on a determination
supported by a set of explanations each of which is different and impossible
to reconcile with the other." 95 Here, the Appellate Body disagreed with the
Panel and reversed its decision, concluding that the affirmative findings
based on different product groupings are not necessarily mutually
exclusive.96 The Appellate Body was of the view that nothing in the SA
prevents the national investigating authority from setting out multiple
findings to support its determination and that it is the Panel's obligation to
consider each of them to assess if any one of them
provides a reasoned and
97
adequate explanation of its final determination.
This Appellate Body decision raises questions. The Appellate Body
stated, "the Panel should have continued its enquiry by examining the views
of the three Commissioners separately, in order to ascertain whether one of
these sets of findings contained a reasoned and adequate explanation for the
USITC's 'single institutional determination' on tin mill products. 9 8 Does
this language suggest that the investigating authority has provided a
reasoned conclusion when multiple interpretations are not reconciled with
one another, but only one of them is found adequate and reasonable to
support the determination?
If so, is this position consistent with the
relevant requirement under the SA?

93 Report of the Panel, supra note 6,
10.214-10.215, 10.224, 10.233, 10.244, 10.25310.254. The panel confined its analysis of the existence of import increases to basic
economic statistics, leaving the examination of causation for a later prong of the test of
safeguards' validity, that of Article 4.2(b), as discussed infra. Id
10.255.
94 Id.
10.194. Some Commissioners believed that those products should be included
together in a larger category of products and the others considered them separate products.
The Commissioners' views also diverged regarding injury determinations. The Panel further
explained, "For the purposes of the Agreement on Safeguards, with regard to, for instance,
the question of whether imports have increased, it makes a difference whether the product at
issue is tin mill or a much broader category called CCFRS and containing tin mill products.
The difference is that the import numbers for different product definitions will not be the
same." Id. 10.195. See also, id. 10.261 (regarding stainless steel wire).

9' Id. 9 10.195, 10.262
96 The Appellate Body stated, "We do not believe that an affirmative finding with respect
to a broad product grouping, on the one hand, and an affirmative finding with respect to one
of the products contained in that broad product grouping, on the other hand, are necessarily,
mutually exclusive." Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 6, T 413.
9' Id.

9' Id.

414.
416.
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Article 3.1 provides, "The competent authorities shall publish a report
setting forth their findings and reasoned conclusions reached on all
pertinent issues of fact and law." 99 How can such reasoned conclusions be
made if the explanations offered for the "single institutional
determination ' 0° cannot be reconciled with one another? The Appellate
Body opined that the SA does not necessarily bar safeguards whose
justification relies on multiple explanations that are not reconciled with one
another. Nonetheless, what is subject to judicial review is the adequacy of
the explanations offered by the national investigating authority and not that
of each explanation by the individual members of these authorities.
This raises the issue of the Panel's role in evaluating the explanation of
import increases proffered by an investigating authority. The Panel does
not bear the burden of justifying a safeguard measure based on an adequate
and reasonable explanation. That proof is for the country imposing the
safeguard. However, the Panel seems to be placed in just that position,
given that Article 3.1 does not require the investigating authority to justify
its own decisions after internally reconciling whatever disagreements that
the members within the authority may have. Further judicial clarification
would seem necessary on this point.
C. Parallelism
One of the most important policy provisions of the SA is the
elimination of discriminatory and arbitrary import restrictions. 10 1 The
question of whether a Member should be allowed to apply a safeguard
measure selectively on the basis of the origin of the imported product was
the subject of much discussion during the Uruguay Round.10 2 After lengthy
negotiations, the participants agreed to allow safeguards regardless of the
source of imports to prevent arbitrary trade discrimination. The finally
agreed language is as follows: "Safeguard measures shall be applied to a
product being imported irrespective of its source."'0 3 This provision
affirms the MFN application of safeguard measures and does not in
principle allow Members to discriminate among exporters in applying
safeguards.
On the other hand, for imports from countries with which a Member
has free trade agreements ("FTAs"), the Member may well wish to exempt
such products from safeguards. In the steel safeguards, the United States
99Safeguards Agreement, supra note 3, art. 3.1 (emphasis added).
100 Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 6, 416.
101These restrictions, called "gray-area measures," were prevalent during 1970s and
1980s, and Article 11 of the SA prohibits all kinds of gray-area measures. See LEE,
SAFEGUARD MEASURES, supra note 1, chs. 3.2 and 8.4 (discussing gray-area measures).
102 See id. at ch. 3 (discussing the negotiation process for the settlement of the SA).
103 Safeguards Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2.2 (emphasis added).
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exempted steel imports from Canada, Mexico, Israel and Jordan, pursuant
to its NAFTA obligations. °4 Prior to the U.S. steel safeguards, WTO
panels and the Appellate Body had already made it clear that the mostfavored-nation ("MFN") requirement (non-discriminatory application of
safeguards) of Article 2 does not allow a Member to consider injury based
on imports from all sources and then exempt the imports from some
countries from the scope of its safeguard measure. 10 5 In Line Pipe, the
Appellate Body ruled that any gap between the scope of injury assessment
and the scope of safeguard measure is justified only if the Member
establishes explicitly that imports from sources covered by the measure
satisfy the conditions for the application of a safeguard measure under
Articles 2.1 and 4.2 of the SA. 106 This requirement ensures parallelism
between the scope of injury assessment and the scope of the application of
the safeguard.
Thus, under the applicable WTO precedent, the exemptions in the U.S.
steel safeguards would run afoul of Article 2.2's parallelism requirement
under normal circumstances. However, if the U.S. investigative body were
to make a positive injury determination based solely on imports from
countries that were not exempt from its safeguards it would arguably
comply with Article 2.2.107 The U.S. Steel Safeguards Panel found that
when the determination and the eventual measure do not correspond in
terms of scope, to uphold the safeguard, Members must explicitly establish
that imports from the sources studied satisfy the conditions for safeguard
action. 18
What evidence, then, is required to establish that subjecting imports to
safeguard measures with exemptions is legal?' 0 9 The United States argued
that a formal conclusion by the competent authority as to whether non-FTA
imports have caused serious injury is sufficient, and would not require a
recitation of each step of the analytical process leading to that conclusion." 0
The Panel disagreed, ruling that beyond deference to a finding by domestic
authorities, an adequate, reasoned explanation of the conclusions would be
Proclamation No. 7529, supra note 7, TT 8, 11.
Wheat Gluten, supra note 45, 9 8.176-8.178,
Appellate Body Report on United States - Wheat Gluten, supra note 45, 97 98-100;
Appellate Body Report on United States - Line Pipe, supra note 45, 9 178-181.
106 Appellate Body Report on United States - Line Pipe,supra note 45, 183.
107 In U.S. Steel Safeguards, the U.S. contended that the USITC's analysis in the Second
104

105 Panel Report on United States -

Supplementary Report, read in conjunction with the initial USITC Report, satisfies the
requirement of parallelism. See Report of the Panel, supra note 6, 10.587.
108 Report of the Panel, supra note 6, T 10.592. The United States argued that there is no
requirement for the explicit establishment in the SA, but the Appellate Body affirmed the
Panel position. Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 6, 444.
109 Id. 10.594.
10 Id. 10.592.
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required to support a determination that the products covered in the measure
alone have caused serious injury to the domestic industry. 1 '
Making measure-by-measure assessments to determine whether the
United States fulfilled the requirement of parallelism, the Panel concluded it
had not. In all product categories, the Panel found that the United States
had failed to explicitly establish that imports fulfilled the conditions for the
application of a safeguard measure. In fact, the United States failed to
prove the elements required under the SA to show that the non-exempt
imports caused injury to the domestic industry. A few conclusory
paragraphs in the Second Supplementary Report commenting on the effect
of the exclusion were insufficient. 1 2 The Panel also stressed that the causal
effects of excluded imports were not adequately addressed under Article
4.2(b) of the SA." 3
On appeal, the United States argued that nothing in the SA required a
distinct or explicit analysis of imports from sources not subject to the
measure. 114 The Appellate Body affirmed the Panel decision, finding that
the possible injurious effects that excluded imports may have on the
domestic industry must not be attributed to imports included in the
safeguard measure pursuant to Article 4.2(b)." l5 The Appellate Body was
also of the view that the Member must make a single joint determination of
injurious impact during the investigative phase, rather than making separate

...
Id. 10.195-10.196.
112 With respect to CCFRS, the Panel opined that there were analytical flaws in the
USITC report. First, the causal effects of the excluded products were not adequately
considered. Second, the USITC discussion of "non-NAFTA imports" still included the
imports from Israel and Jordan, which were excluded from the U.S. steel safeguards and
therefore should have been excluded along with NAFTA imports in the USITC analysis. Id.
10.601-.10.609. The Panel made the same conclusions with respect to the other eight
product categories. Id.
10.623, 10.633, 10.643, 10.653, 10.660, 10.670, 10.680, 10.692.
The split of opinions among the USITC Commissioners with respect to tin mill products and
stainless steel wire were also noted. The Panel did not make the causation analysis on
stainless steel rod, but the Panel also concluded that the USITC's implicit and cursory
determination did not amount to the reasoned and adequate explanation required under arts.
2 and 4 of the SA. Appellate Body Report, supra note 6, 10.699.
...
Article 4.2(b) of the SA provides that:
The [injury] determination ... shall not be made unless the investigation demonstrates, on
the basis of objective evidence, the existence of the causal link between increased imports of
the product concerned and serious injury or threat thereof. When factors other than increased
imports are causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time, such injury shall not be
attributed to increased imports.
Safeguards Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4.2(b). See infra Section III.D.2. (discussing the
issue of causation).
114 Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 6,
447.
115 Id.
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and partial determinations. To make such a determination, the investigative
body must not take into account imports from any country that was
excluded from the safeguards, although imports
16 from some of those
countries are very small and almost non-existent.'
The Panel and Appellate Body decisions on parallelism impose
considerable analytical burdens on a Member applying a safeguard measure
involving the exclusion of imports from some select sources. For instance,
the United States has a treaty obligation to exempt the imports of some of
its trading partners from duties.'1 7 The Steel Panel and the Appellate Body
decisions seem to indicate that a Member may in fact exempt imports from
certain countries from the safeguard measure as long as the requirement of
the parallelism is met.
It is noteworthy that the existence of a free trading agreement is not
required as a prerequisite to the legal imposition of selective safeguards. If
the current rule is that a Member may target imports from a small number
of countries, provided the Member explicitly establishes that the imports
from those countries alone cause or threaten to cause serious injury,
application of MFN safeguards is thrown into question. It is still arguable
that this selective application of a safeguard measure is different from the
arbitrary and discriminatory application of gray-area measures in the past
since the Member will still have to satisfy the injury and causation
requirements under the SA.
On the other hand, the Panel in Line Pipe found that the authorization
of a free trading area under GATT Article XXIV is legal ground for an
exclusion: the exclusion is permissible among Members bound by mutual
FTAs. i1 8 The Appellate Body, however, avoided ruling on this question,
stating that it did not want to "prejudge" an Article XXIV issue.19 The
Panel's analysis of Article XXIV appears correct. Exclusion of imports
from a country not party to an FTA could perhaps violate the parallelism
requirement under Article 2.2 because it would not have the Article XXIV
justification limited to the members of free trade areas. In fact, permitting
selective applications of a safeguard measure against imports from one or a
small number of countries without any justifying apparatus such
20 as an FTA
significantly undermines the agreement on MFN safeguards. 1
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Id. 468.

117 NAFTA Implementation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-182,

§ 302, 107 Stat. 2057,
2115 (1993).
118 PanelReport on the United States - Line Pipe,supra note 45,
7.135-.163.
119 Appellate Body Report on the United States - Line Pipe,supra note 45, 198.
120 See LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES, supra note 1, at ch. 3 (for an account of the long

negotiation process of the SA).
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D. Injury Assessment
1.

Considerationof injuryfactors

A safeguard measure is predicated on the existence or threat of serious
injury to a domestic industry caused by increase in imports. 12 1 The injury
determination is not a precise science and cannot avoid certain degree of
subjectivity. Nonetheless, clear guidelines for the injury determination can
reduce arbitrariness in the injury determination. The SA attempts to
provide such criteria for the injury determination. Article 4.2(a) provides:
In the investigation to determine whether increased imports have caused
or are threatening to cause serious injury to a domestic industry under
the terms of this Agreement, the competent authorities shall evaluate all
relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing
on the situation of that industry, in particular, the rate and amount of the
increase in imports of the product concerned in absolute and relative
terms, the share of the domestic market taken by increased imports,
changes in the level of sales, production,122 productivity, capacity
utilization,profits and losses, and employment.

Unlike its predecessor, Article XIX, the SA specifies eight factors,
underlined above, relevant to the analysis of injury.'12 Because, on its face,
the statute requires competent authorities to evaluate all relevant factors
including those enumerated in the statute, previous panels and the Appellate
Body have 124interpreted it to mean that consideration of every factor is
mandatory.
In applying the U.S. steel safeguards, however, the USITC failed to
consider some of the injury factors specified in Article 4.2(b). For instance,
the changes in productivity were not analyzed in the USITC investigation
report.' 2 Such an analysis would have been relevant due to the United
States' reliance on the argument that a steel 126
sector employment decrease
indicated injury to the domestic steel industry.
Any change in productivity should have been analyzed as it may have
affected the injury determination. Curiously, the complainants did not raise

121

122
123

Safeguards Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2.1.
Id at art. 4.2(a) (emphasis added).
These specific injury factors were modeled after the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, 19

U.S.C. 2317 §§ 202(c)(1)(A)-(B).

124 Panel Report on Korea - Dairy Products, supra note 45,

Argentina - Footwear, supra note 45,

Footwear,supra note 45,

125 Steel, supra note 56.

7.55; Panel Report on

8.206; Appellate Body Report on Argentina -

136.

126 For further discussion, see supra Section II.A.
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this issue in the panel and the Appellate Body proceedings; if they had, the
omission would likely have constituted a violation of Article 4.127
Unlike in Article 4.2(a), productivity is not a listed factor in the U.S.
Trade Act of 1974, after which the injury factors in Article 4 were
modeled. 128 This absence perhaps explains why the USITC did not analyze
productivity. The injury factors need not be identical between the national
legislation and the SA to achieve conformity with WTO requirements. For
instance, the safeguard provisions of the European Communities include
more injury factors than those of the SA. 2 9 Raising the standards beyond
the SA to make it more difficult to adopt safeguard measures thus conforms
to the WTO requirements. The opposite, however, may be considered an
instance of non-compliance with the SA.
The USITC should have
considered all the factors specifically listed under Article 4.2(a), regardless
of whether comparable domestic legislation required so extensive an
investigation.
2.

Causation

The application of a safeguard measure will hardly be justifiable
unless the injury to the domestic industry is in fact caused by the increase in
imports. The SA requires a Member applying a safeguard measure to
establish a causal link between the injury and the increase in imports.
Article 4.2(b) of the SA provides:
The determination referred to in subparagraph (a) (injury determination)
shall not be made unless this investigation demonstrates, on the basis of
objective evidence, the existence of the causal link between increased
imports of the product concerned and serious injury or threat thereof.
When factors other than increased imports are causing injury to the
domestic industry at30 the same time, such injury shall not be attributed to
increased imports.'
Previous panel and Appellate Body decisions have provided
interpretive guides to this provision requiring causation. In ArgentinaFootwear, the Panel prescribed a three-pronged test for the determination of
causation.13 ' The first prong of the test requires the coincidence between an
127 Supra note 124.
128 On the other hand, productivity is included with respect to a threat of serious injury.
See supra note 123.
129 European Union Council Regulation No. 3285/94 of Dec. 22, 1994, 1994 O.J. (L 349)
at art. 10.
130 Safeguard Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4.2(b) (explanations added).
131PanelReport on Argentina-Footwear,supra note 45, 8.229. The Appellate Body
affirmed this test. Appellate Body Report on Argentina - Footwear, supra note 45,
14046. This test was also followed by the subsequent Panel in the Panel Report on United States
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upward trend in imports and downward trends in the injury factors. If no
such coincidence is found, there must be a reasoned explanation as to why
the data nevertheless show causation. The second prong is whether
objective evidence regarding the conditions of competition in the domestic
market demonstrates a causal link between the imports and any injury.
Lastly, the Panel must assess whether other relevant factors have been
analyzed, including whether the country imposing safeguards properly
examined alternative explanations for the injury (also termed the "nonattribution requirement"). In the presence of factors other than increased
imports that may have also contributed to injury, safeguard measures may
be justified on the basis that an increase in imports made a sufficiently clear
contribution to the demonstrated injury, in other words, a country imposing
safeguards need not show that the increase in imports alone caused the
injury.132

The Panel in U.S. Steel Safeguards found that the causal link between
increased imports and injury was insufficient for all product categories
except one.1 3 The Panel ruled that the USITC failed to establish the
coincidence between the increasing trends in imports and decreasing trends
in the injury factors and also failed to provide any other compelling
argument as to why the causal link nevertheless existed. 34 In particular, the
USITC improperly disregarded a number of relevant factors that affected its
injury, namely, declining domestic demand, domestic capacity increases,
intra-industry competition and legacy costs in its non-attribution analysis
although it acknowledged that those factors had some injurious effect on the
industry. 35
- Wheat Gluten, supra note 45, T 8.91.
132 Appellate Body Report on United States - Wheat Gluten, supra note 45,
67.
According to the Appellate Body, the last sentence of Article 4.2(b) (non-attribution
requirement) requires the national authorities to examine the existence of "a genuine and
substantial relationship of cause and effect" between the increase in imports and the injury
and distinguish injurious effects caused by the other factors from that by the increase in
imports. Id. 69. See LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES, supra note 1, at 48-49, 132-34
(discussing the causation test).
133 The Panel held that the causation requirement was not met with respect to CCFRS, tin
mill products, hot-rolled bar, cold-finished bar, rebar, welded-pipe, FFTJ, stainless steel bar,
stainless steel wire. Report of the Panel, supra note 6,
10.419, 10.422, 10.445, 10.469,
10.487, 10.503, 10.536, 10.569, 10.573. For stainless steel rod, the Panel considered that the
USITC's causation analysis was not inconsistent with the requirement under Article 4.2(b).
!d 10.586.
134 For CCFRS, the Panel did not consider that the USITC's selective use of data
of the
constituent items of the CCFRS and not the whole CCFRS was adequate without
establishing that those selective items were representative of the whole CCFRS. Id. TT
10.378-.380. The Panel provided measure-by-measure analyses for all product categories.
Id. 10.361-10.586.
135 Id. Regarding tin mill products and stainless steel wire, the Panel noted that there
were conflicting opinions among the USITC Commissioners as to the existence of the
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E. Notification and Consultation
36
As safeguard measures are not applied to unfair trade practices,
invoking them will inevitably upset the balance of concessions between the
exporting and importing Members. From the standpoint of the exporting
Members, notice of possible changes affecting their ability to export
products is critical, including information on the investigation and the
application of safeguard measures. Article 12 of the SA requires Members
to notify the WTO Committee on Safeguards at various stages of a
safeguard investigation: at the initiation of the investigation (Article
12.1(a)); upon the finding of serious injury or threat thereof (Article
12.1(b)); and finally, upon the decision to apply or extend a safeguard
measure (Article 12.1(c)).
Under Article 12.1(c), notification must be made well before the
measure is implemented, since the purpose of notification is to allow
exporting Members sufficient time to prepare and enter into consultations
priorto the safeguard's effective date.' Article 12.3 provides:
A Member proposing to apply or extend a safeguard measure shall

provide adequate opportunity for prior consultations with those
Members having a substantial interest as exporters of the product
concerned, with a view to, inter alia, reviewing the information under
paragraph 2, exchanging views on the measure and reaching an
understanding on ways to achieve the objective set out in paragraph 1 of
Article 8.131
Consultations are an essential procedural aspect of safeguard
applications. They enable importing and exporting Members to negotiate
the proposed measure to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement and to
maintain the balance of concessions. The timing of consultation is
requisite causation based on the different product definitions. The Panel found that "a
Member is not permitted to base its safeguard measures on an explanation that consists of
alternative explanations which, given the different products upon which such explanations
are based, cannot be reconciled as a matter of substance." Report of the Panel, supra note 6,
10.422, 10.572. Here, the Appellate Body, without deciding whether the USITC's
explanation of the causation was adequate, ruled that the Panel's dismissal of the USITC's
analysis based on the Commissioners' divergent opinions was not justifiable, applying the
same reasoning that it did in the discussion of the increased imports with respect to those two
product categories. Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 6,
492-93. The same
concern about this Appellate Body ruling as expressed in that discussion is also applicable
here.
136The application is subject to the general condition under Article 2 of the SA as well as
the other requirements under the SA and GATT Article XIX.
137Appellate

Body Report on United States - Wheat Gluten, supra note 45,

8.207.
138Safeguards Agreement, supra note 3, art. 12.3.

8.205-
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important to achieve those ends. Members are not required to modify or
withdraw their measures following the consultations, but an effort to
accommodate the interests and concerns of the Members affected by the
safeguards minimizes the potential for disputes and retaliations. ,39
The adequacy of consultations is a recurring issue in cases where the
validity of safeguards is under dispute. A nation adopting safeguards must
provide the exporting countries with adequate time to prepare and enter into
consultations. 14 0 In Line Pipe, the United States waited only eighteen days
between announcing a final measure and implementing the measure, after
having significantly changed the terms of the safeguard post-consultation.
The Appellate Body ruled that eighteen days was insufficient time to
adequately consult after the changes were made, disregarding the United
States' arguments that the complaining party would have been able to
request new consultations after the announcement of the final measure. 141
In the U.S. steel safeguards, the safeguard measures took effect only
15 days after the United States announced the measures had been
adopted. 142 Surprisingly, the issue of timeliness of consultation was not
raised by the complainants in the panel proceedings. Had the issue been
before the Panel, this inadequately short time between announcement and
the implementation would almost certainly have been ruled a violation of
Article 12. In fact, the lack of the genuine effort to provide adequate
consultation opportunity and to reach a mutually agreeable settlement
contributed to the rapid escalation of crisis after the application of the steel
safeguards, as manifested by the several retaliation proposals from the
exporting Members.
F. Concluding Legal Analysis of the U.S. Steel Safeguards
The U.S. steel safeguards demonstrated fundamental flaws with
respect to various major requirements for the application of a safeguard
measure under Article XIX and the SA. The Panel and the Appellate Body
did not find the increase in imports in most product categories. The MFN
application requirement under Article 2.2 of the SA was violated, The
injury analysis under Article 4 was also considered inadequate and the
required causation was not found in most product categories. The United
States also failed to make demonstration of "unforeseen developments"
under Article XIX, although the requirement itself is controversial.
In addition, although the complainants did not raise these issues in the
panel proceedings, the United States did not provide adequate consultation

139 See LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES, supra note 1, at ch. 11.2 and 11.3.
140 Appellate Body Report on United States - Line Pipe, supra note 45,

Id. 107-108.
142See also LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES, supra note 1, at 167-68.
141

102-113.
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opportunities as required under Article 12.1 prior to the application of its
steel safeguards. In sum, the U.S. steel safeguards failed to comply with
major substantive and procedural requirements of safeguards applications
under the SA.
IV.

CONCLUSION - TEST OF MULTILATERALISM IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Safeguard measures are widely considered the most protective of all
trade measures due to their unilateral applicability without the requirement
of any unfair trade practice on the part of the exporters. Safeguard
measures will inevitably upset the balance of concessions reached among
Members during the previous trade negotiations. For this reason, safeguard
measures are prone to invite disputes and potential retaliations, particularly
where the legal justifications under the relevant WTO rules are weak and
where adequate efforts to reach a satisfactory settlement between the
exporting and importing Members are not made. To minimize the danger
of this potentially very abusive measure, a multilateral framework is in
place, including the prior consultation requirement.
Did this multilateral framework work in the U.S. steel safeguards? It
did not seem to initially. There was serious doubt as to whether the United
States had complied with the requirements of the SA. As discussed above,
the United States applied a series of safeguard measures to a wide range of
steel products where it was not even clear that the basic premises for the
application of a safeguard measure, such as an increase in imports and
causation between the injury and imports, existed at all. It was widely
believed that political needs, rather than the economic necessities backed b
the legal justifications, prompted the application of the steel safeguards.' 3
Political motivations do not necessarily make safeguards incompatible with
the requirements of the SA and Article XIX, but the lack of essential legal
conditions do.
The subsequent crisis in the U.S. steel safeguards, which gave rise to
the danger of a worldwide trade war, began with the rushed manner in
which the U.S. government applied its safeguards and continued on in the
U.S.' disregard for the adequate consultation requirement. 44 Such events
suggested that the U.S. government did not seriously contemplate the need
143A

renowned economist has opined that the steel safeguards would not improve the
condition of the U.S. steel industry. See Robert J, Barro, Big Steel Doesn't Need Any More
Popping Up, Bus. WK., Apr. 1, 2001, at 24. It has been also reported that the U.S. Treasury
Secretary Paul H. O'Neill stated in the off-the-record comments after a dinner speech at the
Council on Foreign Relations that the steel safeguards would cost more jobs in the United
States than it would save. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2002, at Al. See supra Section II.A.
(discussing the political background of the U.S. steel safeguards).
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See the discussion of notifications and consultations in Section III.E. supra.
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of those consultations under Article 12 of the SA and the possible
consequences of neglecting them. Although internal political pressures
played a role in the rush and neglect, 145 a high political price was also paid
for them in the form of strong worldwide condemnations of the U.S.
measures, the filing of WTO complaints by more nations than in any other
dispute in the GATT/WTO history as well as proposal of several
retaliations by major economies around the world. 46
As the dispute progressed, the multilateral framework in place within
the world trading system was called upon to avert the crisis. The retaliation
proposals by exporting Members were made in accordance with the relevant
SA provisions, and the exporting Members refrained from applying
retaliations until the conclusion of WTO panel and the Appellate Body
proceedings. 4 7 Facing several retaliation proposals, the United States also
entered into consultations with some exporting Members and agreed to
reduce steel products from its safeguard list. 48 The multilateral framework
proved operational and resolved this dispute when the United States
49
accepted the WTO DSB decision, although it ruled against its measures.
The development of the U.S. steel safeguards has demonstrated how
important it is for Members to adhere to the multilateral framework of the
international trading system including due compliance with the WTO legal
requirements. The initial neglect of the multilateral framework in the
application of the U.S. steel safeguards brought the international
community into a major trade dispute. Although the United States'
negotiations subsequent to its application of safeguards helped resolve the
crisis,1 50 such crisis may never have developed had the United States
respected the multilateral framework and conducted adequate prior
consultations required under Article 12.
Pursuing a process of adopting safeguards without complying with
WTO requirements may also drive other Members to do the same in order
to protect their own export interests, as witnessed subsequent to the
application of the U.S. steel safeguards,' 51 creating a chain of worldwide
145

An immediate and comprehensive import relief was demanded by the steel industry.

Recommended Action to Solve the Steel Import Crisis, May 9, 2001, Proposal by the Steel
Manufacturers Association.
146 See supra Section I.B.
147 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
("Dispute Settlement Understanding" or "DSU") governs the proceedings of the panel as
well as of the Appellate Body. WTO, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS, 404-33 (1994).
148 See the relevant discussions in section II.B supra.
149 The exporting Members also followed the suit, and the proposed retaliations were
never applied.
150 See supra Section I.B.
151As discussed above, some Members including European Communities and China also
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protectionism.
U.S. Steel Safeguards is a notable example of politically motivated
trade measures applied in the absence of clear legal justifications under
WTO rules and without due regard to the multilateral framework of the
52
safeguards, which could have been led to a full scale trade war.
Nonetheless, a consolation may be found in that the successful resolution of
this highly publicized dispute has in fact strengthened rather than weakened
the multilateral framework of the WTO. Furthermore, the dispute in the
U.S. steel safeguards has left us a clear lesson that the failure to duly
recognize and respect the multilateral framework of international trade in
the application of a trade measure, including its legal requirements, will
invite costly disputes down the road.

applied safeguard measures against their import of steel products subsequent to the U.S. steel
safeguards to prevent "diversion" of steel exports from the U.S. market protected from the
steel safeguards. Id
152 See supra Section l.B.

